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International Terrorism
BUTCH BRACKNELL*

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its member states
consider international terrorism to be a threat to the Alliance because of the
threat international terrorism represents to their constituent populations.'
International terrorism striking NATO states and their populations has been
on the rise through the 1970s and 80s, from discotheque bombings in
Germany,2 radical political group kidnappings and assassinations in Greece,3
"the troubles" in the UK and Northern Ireland,4 through 9/11,1 train and
bus bombings in Spain6 and the UK,7 to more recently shooting/bombing
attacks in Pariss and Brussels.9 The stakes have escalated as groups like Al
Qaeda, al-Qaeda affiliated franchise, and the Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant (also known as ISIL, ISIS, and Daesh) have shown tendencies toward
an unwillingness to respond to traditional negotiated political solutions
toward all-out war with a solely military dimension.
* Assistant Legal Advisor, International Law NATO Allied Command Transformation
Norfolk, Virginia.
1. Press Release, NATO, NATO Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Head of State and
Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales (Sept. 5,
2014) available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official-texts_1 12964.htm.
2. 1986: Berlin Disco Bombed, BBC HOME (Apr. 5, 2005) http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/
dates/stories/april/5/newsid_4357000/4357255.stm.
3. Greek Domestic Terrorism, National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Counterterrorism
Guide, https://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/greek-domestic.html.
4. Joshua Hammer, In Northern Ireland, Getting Past the Troubles, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE
(Mar. 2009), available at http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/in-northern-irelandgetting-past-the-troubles-52862004/?no-ist.
5. See generally The 9/11 Commission Report, The National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States (July 22, 2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/
report/911 Report.pdf.
6. Spain Train Bombings FastFacts, CNN (Mar. 4, 2016), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/04/
world/europe/spain-train-bombings-fast-facts.
7. 7 July London Bombings: What Happened That Day?, CNN (July 3, 2015), http://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-33253598.
8. Andrew Higgins and Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, Paris Suspect Drafted an ElaboratePlot of
TerrorAcross Europe, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/20/world/
europe/paris-attacks.html?_r=0.
9. Griff Witte, Souad Mekhennet and Michael Birnbaum, Islamic State Claims Responsibility
for the Brussels Attacks, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
brussels-on-high-alert-after-explosions-at-airport-and-metro-station/2016/03/22/b5e9f232f018-1 1e5-a6lf-e9c95cO6edca-story.html.
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While certain member states see terrorism as a hybrid problem inviting
military, law enforcement, diplomatic, economic and political solutions,
other member states, particularly in Europe, deemphasize the military
component of counterterrorism.1o As a consensus-based organization,
NATO therefore has adopted a counterterrorism stance that uses military
capabilities indirectly against terrorism, even as it seeks new and inventive
ways to apply military capabilities to address this seemingly intractable and
persistent problem."
If NATO were to organize a military response to a terrorist event, it could
act only under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter (collective self-defense), or
under Chapter VII, when authorized by the Security Council.12 Media
commentators often "invoke Article 5" of the North Atlantic Treaty as legal
authority to act under international law, a common misunderstanding of the
meaning and utility of this provision.'3 The North Atlantic Treaty alone
confers no authority under international law to undertake an armed attack or
use of force against a state or international non-state actor. The Treaty does
not even define NATO as a "regional agency" under Chapter VIII of the
UN Charter. Rather, NATO, per the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty, is
merely a mutual defense pact, such that where Article 51 of the UN Charter
authorizes the use of force in self-defense, it authorizes it for all NATO
member states by virtue of the state's multilateral commitment to NATO.14
Regional organizations include OAS, ECOWAS, AU, ASEAN, Arab
League, etc. - but not NATO, for this purpose.
I.

NATO Responses to Mass Maritime Migration

One recent, ongoing NATO "activity" touching on the issue of the
mobility of potential terrorist actors through Europe's borders is the NATO
response to the mass migration from North Africa and the Levant, through
southeastern Europe, into the heart of the continent.15 In response, NATO
authorized the deployment of Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 assets to
provide assistance to the refugee/migrant crisis in eastern Mediterranean.16
10. Patryk Pawlak, Understanding Hybrid Threats, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH
BLOG (une
24, 2015), https://epthinktank.eu/2015/06/24/understanding-hybridthreats.
11. CounteringTerrorism, NATO (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_77
646.htm.
12. See U.N. Charter ch. VII.
13. Ilya Somin, Using Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to Legalize the War Against ISIS
[Updated with Response to Julian Ku], WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2015), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/11/15/using-article-5-of-the-nato-treaty-tolegalize-the-war-against-isis/?utm_term=.8ae260471732.
14. See U.N. Charter art 51, para. 1.
15. NATO's MaritimeActivities, NATO (uly 12, 2016), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/to
pics_70759.htm.
16. Yuri M. Zhukov, NATO's MediterraneanMission: What the Alliance is Doing in the Aegean
Sea, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Feb. 21, 2016), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/201602-2 1/natos-mediterranean-mission.
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This current expanded "activity" includes interdicting people-smuggling
of migrants at sea and returning them to Turkey for repatriation by national
coast guards, with NATO support only - that is, there is no authorized, direct
interdiction by NATO forces unless a mariner is in distress.17 On February
10-11, 2016, at a regularly scheduled NATO Defense Ministers' meeting,
the Secretary General stressed that this activity's is "not about stopping or
pushing back refugee boats," but about contributing "critical information
and surveillance to help counter human trafficking and criminal networks."19
As part of the agreement, NATO will cooperate closely with national
coastguards and the European Union to stop human trafficking, provide
situational awareness of migrants taking to the seas on their own, and
working to screen potential terrorists out of migrant populations allowed to
enter Europe's borders.20
NATO's focus is on deterring people-smugglers through intelligence and
surveillance, sharing information with Greek and Turkish coast guards, and
EU border control agency. 21 The Greeks and Turks have agreed to wary
cooperation, as each traditional rival concurred not to operate in the other's
territorial waters. 22 Political reaction to NATO's response has been varied,
with the UNHCR Europe Bureau concerned that a military response may
"undermine the institution of asylum for people in need of international
protection."23 Another concern posited by humanitarian groups is the
prospect of NATO ships in the Aegean may encourage people to take to the
Aegean Sea for passage, if they see NATO as a guarantor against the
17. Id.
18. NATO sometimes weathers criticism about its decision cycles and timeliness of action. See
Uwe Benecke, Reconsidering NATO's Decision Making Process, US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT (Mar. 30, 2007), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/
GetTRDoc?AD=ADA467165. But consider on February 8, German Chancellor Merkel and
Turkish PM Davutoglu announced they would seek NATO's help with migration crisis calling
on alliance to monitor the flow of smuggler ships destined for Europe. By February 10-11, the
Defense Ministers had convened to discuss this topic and, acting as the North Atlantic Council,
authorize action, among others, and by February 11, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR) had ordered three ships from SNMG-2 to begin patrols in Aegean Sea. Work is
ongoing to refine rules of engagement, caveats, and procedures and obligations (national) for
rescue at sea, differentiating between economic migrants and political refugees.
19. Statement by the NATO Secretary General on NATO Support to Assist with the Refugee and
Migrant Crisis, NATO (Feb. 25, 2016), available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
opinions_128372.htm.
20. John Vandiver, British Warships joining NATO Mission to Combat Human Trafficking in
Aegean, STARS AND STRIPES (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.stripes.com/news/british-warshipsjoining-nato-mission-to-combat-human-trafficking-in-aegean-1.397996.
21. Michael S. Schmidt and Sewell Chan, NATO Will Send Ships to Aegean Sea to DeterHuman
Trafficking, N.Y. TIMES (Fed. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/world/europe/
nato-aegean-migrant-crisis.html.
22. Robin Emmott, NATO Overcomes Greek-Turkish Tensions to Agree Aegean Mission, REUTERS
(Feb. 25, 2016) http://www.reuters.com/article/europe-migrants-nato-idUSL8N1640TR.
23. The Syrian Refugee Crisis and the Need for U.S. Leadership, Executive Summary, HUMAN
RIGHTS FIRST (Feb. 2016), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-SyrianRef-Crisis-ExSum.pdf.
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dangerous journey, feeding hopes of safe passage. 24 Finally, some of the
opposition has occurred from within the alliance itself: Military Committee
Chairman, Czech General Petr Pavel, observed "If we are to pick the more
significant of the two threats (refugees and Russia) then a government with
an exceptional military arsenal, including nuclear weapons, which
unabashedly violates international agreements, undoubtedly takes the top
position."25 Even so, NATO's measured response to the migrant crisis is
ongoing.

It is important to note NATO has not been engaged in stopping or
turning away migrant boats. Rather, NATO's role has been to monitor and
report maritime flows of migrants from Turkey to Greece, collecting and
sharing intelligence on smuggling networks with national law enforcement
and coast guards.26 NATO ships encountering boats in distress defer to
Turkish or Greek coast guards to handle any rescue, intervening only as the
last resort when necessary, as the duty to rescue by warships arguably is
required by international maritime law.27

Human rights law, of course, looms large over the issue of handling
migrants. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case of Hirsi
]amaa v. Italy is one monumental case that causes concern to the allies, and,
by extension, to the Alliance. In ]amaa, three vessels with twenty-four
Somali and Eritrean nationals bound for Italy from Libya were intercepted
by Italian Guardia di Finanza (law enforcement) and Coast Guard within
thirty-five nautical miles of Agrigento, in Sicily, May 2009.28 They were
returned to Tripoli under the provisions of an Italian/Libyan bilateral
agreement, with no attempt to identify their nationality.29 Italy's stated
"Push Back Policy" is designed to reduce "clandestine immigration" and
criminal people smuggling.30 Fourteen of the applicants were granted
refugee status by UNHCR in 2009.31
After exhausting their appeals under Italian law, the ECtHR accepted the
case and found the court had territorial jurisdiction based on Italian law
noting ships are Italian sovereign territory, therefore, the European
Convention on Human Rights, and the court's jurisdiction, applied.32 The
court found that Italy violated Article 3 of the European Convention on
Human Rights by exposing refugees to risk of inhuman and degrading
treatment in Libya, or by potential return to country of origin - an arbitrary
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
3 1.
32.

Zhukov, supra note 16.
Zhukov, supra note 16.
Id.
Id.
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09, Eur. Ct. H.R., 3 (2012).
Id.
Id. at 4
Id.
Id. at 16.
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refoulement, an elementary principle of refugee law in which states are not
allowed to return refugees to locations where abuse is likely.33
The 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees defines a refugee as the
following:
a person who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country. . .or is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to return to

it.34

Article 33 notes "no Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a
refugee in any manner to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion."35 The court
found there was a real risk to the migrants they would be abused in Libya,
with no real protections for refugees in that state as the situation there
deteriorated.36
The court also found, on the issue of mere potential repatriation to
Eritrea and Somalia, there was real danger of violence and torture with
repatriation to either country, so the court looked at whether Libya could
offer guarantees against arbitrary repatriation.37 The court noted that
collective expulsion's lack of legal basis constitutes a violation of Article 4 to
Protocol 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights and ruled against
Italy on that point, as well.38 The court found that Italy's failure to permit

the petitioners to seek a national remedy within the national system of Italy
per Article 13 of the Convention, constituted a denial to the petitioners any
Italian forum before expelling them.39

Finally, under Articles 46 and 41 of the Convention, the court bound Italy
to abide by the final judgment, requiring the Italian government to seek
assurances from Libya regarding the treatment of the petitioners, no further
forced repatriation to Eritrea and Somalia, and a money judgment of 15,000
Euro and costs and interest for each petitioner.40 The case constituted a
complete victory for the petitioners over the Italian government, a fact
widely noticed in the NATO capitals and which has guided national policy
on handling and interacting with refugees since the ]amaa judgment.
Examining the applicability of ]amaa to the current situation in Eastern
Mediterranean, it stands to reason if Turkey intercepts migrants originating
33. Id. at 38.
34. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
35. Id. at art. 33.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Hirsi Jamaa, App. No. 27765/09, at 38.
Id.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 56.
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in Turkey in Turkish territorial waters and takes them back to Turkey, there
is no violation, as this is an internal law enforcement issue. Similarly, if
Turkey intercepts migrants originating in Turkey on the high seas and
returns them to Turkey, presumably there is no problem for the same
reason. Even if they are refugees, there is no refoulment by definition
because the migrants originated in Turkey. However, there is an open
question as to whether other participating NATO nations have a potential
amma type issue if they intercept migrants (potential refugees) on the high
seas and return them to Turkey, depending on what eventually happens to
the migrants once they return to Turkey4' For example, what if the Syrian
war eventually subsides, Turkey repatriates the migrants to Syria, the
violence in Syria intensifies again, and the migrants are harmed or killed?
Does ]amma establish precedent for human rights liability in such a case for
a state party to the European Human Rights Convention? Is the situation
different if the migrants set sail from Syria, or Lebanon?
II.

Maritime Counterterrorism Operations in Mediterranean

Since 9/11, NATO has undertaken maritime patrols of the Mediterranean
to "deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist activity."42 Operation
Active Endeavor is NATO's only current Article 5 operation focused on
counterterrorism. 43 The operation focuses on tracking "suspect vessels,"
building a common operating picture of Mediterranean maritime activity,

and conducting regular queries of maritime vessels at sea. 44 "As of March

2015 NATO had hailed over 122,000 merchant vessels and boarded about
166 suspect ships" (master consent or flag state consent) to inspect
documentation, manifests, and cargo.45
Sixty-five percent of the oil and natural gas consumed in Western Europe
and a huge, unknown portion of energy resources headed to North America
pass through the Mediterranean.46 The Operation Active Endeavor mission
is counterterrorism-oriented, focusing on counter-proliferation and
preventing attacks on commercial ships at sea, but ships and helicopters have
also rescued several hundred civilians on stricken oil rigs and sinking ships.47
The operation has also contributed to the "Mediterranean Dialogue"
security cooperation, which is a NATO partnership program.48 As a result of
41. See EU: Don't Send Syrians Back to Turkey, HumAN RIGHTS WATCH (une 20, 2016),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/06/20/eu-dont-send-syrians-back-turkey.
42. OperationActive Endeavour, NATO (uly 12, 2016), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/to
pics_7932.htm.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. NATO Shipping Centre (March 2015), http://www.shipping.nato.int/operations/AE/
Pages/Results.aspx.
46. Operation Active Endeavour, supra note 42.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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this security cooperation program, Mediterranean Dialogue countries
routinely share "intelligence about suspicious shipping."49
Task Force Endeavour operates in the Mediterranean, but NATO
command and control (OPCON, or operational control) resides with the
NATO Maritime Command (MARCOM) in the UK.50 A rotating array of
surface units, submarines, and maritime patrol aircrafts constitute the task
force.5' For a while, the task force provided escorts through the Straits of
Gibraltar to ships requesting to prevent an MV Limburg (suicide boat
ramming an oil tanker near Yemen) type incident.52 The escort operation
was later suspended, but could be revived quickly as threat assessments
indicate their necessity.53 The operation's principal contributors are
Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain and Turkey, but occasionally the U.S.,
Denmark and Norway participate.54 Some non-NATO states have
participated in varying degrees, including Israel, Morocco, Russia, Georgia
and Ukraine, and even New Zealand.55
III. NATO Member State Obligations Under Convention on
Genocide
The US has described ISIL activities against certain minority groups
(Yazidis, Christians and Shia Muslims) as genocide,56 but the UN has not
done so in any formal or official way. For example, neither the UN General
Assembly nor the UN Security Council has used the term "genocide" in any
resolution, even though the Office of the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights has obliquely characterized ISIL's activities vis-i-vis the
Yazidis with the word "genocide," specifically that ISIL's actions "possibly
constitute genocide" and "may constitute genocide".57
If the Security Council made such a determination, it could authorize
action against ISIL on this basis. Yet even without a Security Council
resolution definitively establishing the existence of genocide, the Genocide
Convention places affirmative obligations on signatory states to undertake
the prevention of genocide - but it does not tell them how or under what
circumstances. From the UN report:
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Operation Active Endeavour, supra note 42.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Amanda Holpuch, Harriet Sherwood, and Own Bowcott, John Kerry: ISIS is Committing
Genocide in Syria and Iraq, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2016/mar/i 7/john-kerry-isis-genocide-syria-iraq.
57. ISIL May have Committed War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide: UN Report,
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER (Mar. 19, 2015), http://
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewslD=1 5720.
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All States are required to determine how to implement their obligations
to ensure respect for international humanitarian law, especially in the
framework of their obligation to investigate and prosecute allegations of
war crimes and genocide. The Government of Iraq has a duty to
investigate all allegations, which concern ISIL, ISF and affiliated armed
groups, as well as other armed militias and to prosecute perpetrators,
including responsible commanders and other superiors.5s
Article I of the Genocide Convention defines genocide as a crime under
international law which the Contracting Parties "undertake to prevent and
to punish."59 Article V places an obligation on states to enact domestic
legislation giving domestic effect to the Convention,60 and Article VIII
empowers any contracting party to call upon the Security Council to take
action "appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide,"
with no geographical restrictions in the treaty. 61 No state has done so.
These are national obligations flowing from the treaty, and NATO is not
a party to the Convention - yet all twenty-eight member states are parties
to the agreement and are bound by it as a function of international law.62 IS
there an optional (political) role for NATO to organize the response in
fulfillment of national obligations? What would trigger NATO's role?
Perhaps only a UNSC resolution inviting NATO to act, or an invitation by a
nation-state for NATO intervention, could cause NATO to act within the
"spirit" of the convention to prevent genocide.
IV.

Other Aspects of NATO Cooperation Against Terrorism
-

It is clear NATO either is a military alliance with a political component
or, after the Cold War, it has evolved into a political alliance with a military
component. 63 But terrorism and counterterrorism are not exclusively, or
perhaps not even primarily, military problems. As we can see, coalition uses
of force, such as aviation delivered fires and SOF raids, have affected ISIL
but have not stopped them from attacks in France, Belgium and Turkey.
What can NATO do to affect ISIL?
First things first: Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is the raison d'etre
for NATO in this context:
58. Rep. of the Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights on the Human Rights
Situation in Iraq in the Light of Abuses Committed by the So-Called Islamic State in Iraq and
the Levant and Associated Groups, 28th Sess., ¶73, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/18 (Mar. 27, 2015).
59. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art 1., Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Convention on Genocide].
60. Id. at 281.
61. Id. at 282.
62. Status of Treaties, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (Aug. 27, 2016), https://treaties.un.org/pages/View
Details.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg~no=IV-1&chapter=4&clang=_en.
63. See NATO's Purpose After the Cold War, BROOKINGS.EDU (Mar. 19, 2001), https://
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/reportchl.pdf.
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The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all
and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each
of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence
recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will
assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually
and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary,
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of
the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken
as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security
Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council
has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international
peace and security.64
There are a few important points to consider regarding this language.
First, inconsistent with imprecise media reporting, this is NOT necessarily a
mutual defense obligation. Rather, it is an obligation to take "such action as
it deems necessary, including the use of armed force"65 leaving up to the
nations to decide individually what they can afford politically, militarily and
maybe financially to use to assist.
Second, in order for Article 5 to be triggered, the NAC has to meet and
unanimously agree. This happened only once following 9/11, and it was
actually announced by Lord Robertson on 12 September 200166 and no
NATO nation "broke silence" in the NAC on the issue.67
Third, Article 5 probably is not going to be triggered by low-yield one-off
attacks like Charlie Hebdo or Brussels, as horrible as they may have been
and will continue to be. It will likely take a strategic attack, such as a massive
yield attack on a sensitive political target, like a national legislature, or an
attack with casualties in the thousands to trigger Article 5, or perhaps an
asymmetric event like a CBRN attack, or a strike on a nuclear power plant.
The 2010 Strategic Concept (Lisbon) and the 2014 Wales Declaration
concluded "[t]errorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of
NATO countries, and" committed Allies to enhance capacity to detect and
defend against international terrorism, including enhanced threat analysis,
more consultations with NATO partners (not Alliance members) and "the
development of appropriate military capabilities."68 For example, NATO

&

64. North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
65. Id.
66. Press Release, NATO, NATO Treaty Commitments in Dealing with Terrorist Attacks
Against the U.S. (Sept. 12, 2001), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/0910/
e0912a.htm.
67. Eric R. Terzuolo, Regional Alliance, Global Threat: NATO and Weapons of Mass Destruction,
1994-2004, NATO (June 29, 2004), http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/03-04/terzuolo.pdf.
68. Gabor Iklody, The New Strategic Concept and the Fight Against Terrorism: Challenges
Opportunities, Centre ofExcellence Defence Against Terrorism, 3 DEF. AGAINST TERRORISM REV. 3
(2010), available at http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/datr/volume6/01 -TheNewStrateg
icConcept-and-theFightAgainstTerrorismChallenges&Opportunities.pdf.
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encourages sharing of information - military and even national (strategic)
intelligence - though, EU privacy laws and European political and social
preferences may loom large over this issue. At the February 2016 Defense
Ministers' meeting, NATO member states also "agreed to step up NATO
support for the international coalition to counter ISIL."69 "'We agreed in
principle to use NATO AWACS surveillanceplanes to backfill nationalAWACS

capabilities,'" said SECGEN Stoltenberg.70 "He noted that this decision will
increase the coalition's ability to 'degrade and destroy the terroristgroup ISIL,
which is our common enemy.'"71 NATO also works in close coordination with

EU, OSCE, and the Global Counterterrorism Force, and develops
capabilities within NATO including reach back support by the JCBRN COE
to operational forces and the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF),
which focused on "three capability umbrellas to defeat asymmetric threats,
incident management, force protection . . . , and network engagement."72
In conclusion, NATO has maintained an active stance in counterrorism
policy and operations, applying military capabilities where warranted to
assist national authorities in dealing with migrant populations among whom
terrorists attempt to blend for safe passage. NATO's ongoing
counterterrorism mission, Operation Active Endeavour, complements other
areas of NATO cooperation in counterterrorism within the limits imposed
by international and national law. For NATO to take a more active role - to
engage in decisive military action against transnational terrorist groups such
as ISIL - would require authority under international law, either in the form
of a Security Council resolution or an invocation of Article 51 collective selfdefense. Either act is a precondition to the NAC invoking the Article 5
mutual obligations to assist in national and collective defense against largescale terrorist attacks.

69. NATO Defence MinistersAgree on NATO Support to Assist with the Refugee and Migrant Crisis,
NATO (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_127981.htm.
70. Id.
7 1. Id.
72. Countering Terrorism, supra note 11.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

